* Please note: in this phrase, 'legalised' describes compliance to procedural standards set out in existing laws and related judicial practices; it does not refer to elements of substantive justice of said laws and judicial practices.
Page 4 of 38 occupation has extended outside Israeli sovereign territory to cover military activities in Palestine (Kretzmer, 2002: 1; 19-21) . The ISC/HCJ's jurisprudence has
given Palestinians the possibility to petition against actions carried out by the Israeli military or under the aegis of the military (Shamir, 1990: 785; Dinstein, 2009 : 25-26, Weill, 2015 . But the court has also extended this right to Israelis in Palestine: based on a widely criticised interpretation of Art 43 of the Hague
Regulations, it considers Israeli settlers part of the 'local population' (Kretzmer, 2002: 65) , distorting the purpose of international humanitarian law (IHL) and disregarding the illegality of transferring parts of the occupying power's population to occupied territories (Art 49(6) Fourth Geneva Convention (GCIV)).
Reflecting on the significance of the Khan-al-Ahmar case, this article considers Roberts (2006) , this paper describes the Israeli control over Palestine a 'permanent regime of legalised control', 1 in contrast to the exceptional temporary nature of military occupation, which is now paradoxically in its fiftieth 1 In this phrase, 'legalised' describes compliance to procedural standards set out in existing laws and related judicial practices; it does not refer to elements of substantive justice of said laws and judicial practices (Playfair, 1992: 205) . More recent socio-legal scholarship illustrates the strategic uses of Israeli trials to gain political advantage over Palestinians, as recently demonstrated by Allo (2016) , and the structural challenges of legal resistance in this context (Weizman, 2016) . Using legal procedure for political ends is a widespread phenomenon (Kirchheimer, 1961 ) not exclusive to the context of Israel/Palestine. Indeed, judicial rituals -including high court trialsmask deeper social functions of law: official procedures carry the 'potential to dehumanize persons through the use of conceptual legal masks', camouflaging the 'human significance' and gravity of certain acts through the illusion that 'legal reasoning will remain on a level of neutral abstraction' (Weyrauch, 1978: 699-670) .
In other words, using legal proceedings to bolster the Israeli grip over Palestine is a more sophisticated tool of control and oppression than the use of military might. Page 6 of 38 (Ratner, 2005: 700) . Kretzmer (2002: 19) has summarised this ambiguity stating that 'over the years Israeli governments pursued policies aimed at integration of the Occupied Territories with Israel while refraining from formally annexing the West Bank'. International law, and in particular the laws of armed conflict, has been used to facilitate Israeli control over the West Bank, giving rise to a 'legal hypocrisy' (Kretzmer, 2013) Palestinians' (Tawil-Souri, 2012: 173) and can enforce a regime of soft boundaries based on identity cards and residency permits that limit the freedom of movement 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (Weill, 2015 , Sultany, 2014 , Kretzmer, 2002 , Harpaz and Shany, 2010 , the Israeli judiciary has substantially contributed to the situation. More generally, (Yiftachel, 2006: 3-9 Writing at the same time, Playfair (1992: 223-224 ) echoed the concern that although 'the occupying power has the right to carry out many actions, including some which would otherwise be in violation of international law' to safeguard its security, those actions have come to embrace every aspect of Palestinian life.
These considerations remain pertinent today, and can be contrasted with the 
From Occupation to a Permanent Regime of Legalised Control
The ICJ has confirmed that Palestine -including the West Bank in its entirety -is considered under military occupation, and as such is governed by the Hague Convention and Regulations of 1907, as well as GCIV, as widely discussed in the literature (Imseis, 2003; Imseis, 2005; Kretzmer, 2005) . The Wall Case also extended human rights obligations (including the ICCPR) to Israeli actions in Palestine, alongside the IHL duties of the occupying power. Yet the laws of military occupation that set out a temporary and exceptional regime of control over an occupied territory and population (Roberts, 1984; Greenwood, 1992; Sassòli, 2005; Benvenisti, 2012) become inadequate in the context of a prolonged and normalised situation of control (Roberts, 1990; Falk, 1989) .
The classic view that 'occupation does not transfer sovereignty' but only authority to govern temporarily presents occupation and annexation as distinct and 'mutually exclusive' legal concepts (Pellet, 1992: 174-175) . This dichotomy has been convincingly rejected by Martti Koskenniemi (2008: 32-35) , in favour of a 'sliding scale' of governance, in which an extended occupation carries features of both Like a sovereign dictatorship, transformative occupation exceeds the legal order that authorizes its provisional assumption of control. (Bhuta, 2005: 738) As the temporary military nature of the occupation fades, and a new order backed by permanent civilian judicial oversight is put in place by the occupying power to maintain control over the occupied territories and population, the overall picture Page 13 of 38 community on issues relating to humanitarian aid and the promotion of various initiatives in Judea and Samaria'.
Two parallel legal regimes have been created for the two groups. Israeli settlers fall under ordinary Israeli civilian justice (Kretzmer, 2013; Gordon, 2008) . In contrast, the administration of justice for Palestinians is through the Israeli military courts, in what has been described as a 'process of judicial domination' of the West Bank (Weill, 2007; Hajjar, 2005) . In addition to the military courts and the residual Palestinian administration of justice over Palestinian-only disputes in Areas A and B, overall judicial oversight in the West Bank is exercised by the ISC/HCJ, a function described as 'a central feature of Israel's legal and political control over these territories' (Kretzmer, 2002: 1) . The ISC/HCJ's 'power to determine whether or not certain actions of the occupant serve the interest of the local population or are at any rate beneficial to such population' has been long criticised (Cassese, 1992: 439-440 ). Already at the 1988 Al-Haq conference in Jerusalem Antonio Cassese (1992) had argued that the court was not in a strong position 'for determining whether or not certain measures of the occupant meet the needs of the local population', because in a 'democratic country', 'such a determination would naturally fall on the various representative bodies of the communities concerned'. Thus in hearing petitions that affect Palestinian rights and needs, the ISC/HCJ is unlikely to adjudicate fairly and impartially.
Under administrative law, the ISC/HCJ exercises judicial review over the other branches of the Israeli state, and enjoys powers 'in matters in which [the HCJ] Furthermore, the length of the occupation, the separation wall (Kattan, 2007) excluded. Yet as recalled by Shehadeh (1992 : 165) Military Order 1213 (1987 granted the status of 'local residents' to settlers, an interpretation that had found favour in the ISC/HCJ jurisprudence since the 1970s (Kretzmer, 2002: 64-65 ). This military order ignores the prohibition of transfer of the occupying power's own civilian population into occupied territory set out clearly in the GCIV, listed as a grave breach in Additional Protocol I (API) (Art 85(4)(a)), subsequently classified as (Weill, 2014: 32-33 ) which distorts the purpose of IHL. Israeli settlers are thus protected on two effective bases, firstly, as members of the local population understood in IHL terms (i.e. as 'protected persons'), and secondly, as civilian nationals of the occupying power, enjoying rights and status of Israeli citizens extraterritorially. Yet notably, the same body of laws is used to restrict Palestinian freedoms, to the extent that the ISC/HCJ has interpreted their welfare as protected persons in a consistently narrow sense for quite some time (Playfair, 1992: 218-220 ).
Kretzmer (2012) gives the action a legal seal of approval and makes it possible to keep doing it under the restrictions set by the Supreme Court. (Alexandrowicz, 2011: 56'51'') (Rishmawi, 1992: 292; Home, 2003) . Under this regime, if a structure does not have the proper Israeli permit, it is likely to be given a demolition order, often justified on security grounds.
Historically the requisition of Palestinian land supported by ISC/HCJ judgments has been used as a means to facilitate settler expansion (with some exceptions) (Playfair, 1992: 223-229) . For a long time security justifications have facilitated the preservation and the expansion of Israeli hold over the West Bank, regardless of the IHL protections afforded to the local Palestinian communities (Playfair, 1992: 229-230 Page 17 of 38 Page 18 of 38
Bedouins were marginalised in the proceedings and silenced in the final hearing.
Their fate was decided in a foreign court, in a foreign language, in a dispute they were not directly party to.
As Khan-al-Ahmar falls within Area C of the West Bank, it is subject to the Israeli planning regime (Diakonia, 2013). All building activity as well as structural The West Bank Bedouins in Area C thus find themselves governed by lawmakers they cannot elect and judged by a foreign court system willing to defer to its own domestic politics. In this context, the ISC/HCJ entrenches the permanent regime of legalised control over the West Bank, exercising almost unimpeded extraterritorial jurisdiction over the Bedouins in Area C, as if fully within Israeli sovereignty.
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction
The laws of armed conflict, Israeli military orders and courts, and the judicial oversight exercised by the ISC/HCJ have provided the political and practical basis for a form of Israeli extraterritorial jurisdiction over the West Bank that is inching closer to de facto sovereignty, described in this article as a permanent regime of legalised control. To the casual observer, the quiet judicial oversight of the ISC/HCJ in the West Bank does not match the aggression associated with military convoys and armed confrontations that come to mind when thinking of military occupation or unilateral annexation by force. Yet the court's role is no less controversial: by Page 20 of 38 Page 23 of 38 The residents of Khan-al-Ahmar are members of the Jahalin tribe, a Bedouin group from the Negev desert (now within Israel) who fled to the West Bank after 1948 (Jamjoum, 2008 (Jamjoum, /2009 NRC, 2015) . Many Negev Bedouins in the West Bank hold refugee status under international law, providing an additional layer of protection (UNRWA, 2013) . Israeli plans to move these communities amount to transfer of civilians, described by one author 'an effective means to secure the fruits of conquest or aggression to the detriment of the civilian population' (Meindersma, 1994: 31) . The transfer of Bedouins from one location to another in the West Bank raises serious questions around the issue of forced displacement, 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19  20  21  22  23  24  25  26  27  28  29  30  31  32  33  34  35  36  37  38  39  40  41  42  43  44  45  46  47  48  49  50  51  52  53  54  55  56  57  58  59 (Falah, 1985; Falah, 1989; Shamir, 1996; Yiftachel, 2003; Nasasra, Richter-Devroe, Abu-Rabia-Queder and Ratcliffe, 2014 Page 26 of 38 decision not to adjudicate on the grounds that the Israeli authorities were actively pursuing alternative solutions at political level to relocate the Bedouin community from Khan-al-Ahmar to Nweimeh (close to Jericho) (Hass, 2014) , where more Page 27 of 38 adequate infrastructure and educational facilities would be provided. The Bedouins of the Khan-al-Ahmar case, however, enjoyed little political agency in this process, while being subject to the decisions of the Israeli judiciary and politicians.
Jurisdiction over Bedouins in the West Bank

Jurisdiction over Settlement Activity
The subject-matter of the dispute goes beyond the demolition of the tyre school in Page 28 of 38
The relationship between the IDF (and the Israeli authorities more generally) and the settlers has been sometimes described as 'symbiotic' (Peled, 2012: 87 
